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Abstract- In today’s volatile global marketplace co-developing of new products is increasingly 
important, owing to the uncertainties of developing and launching a new product. The 
collaborative new product development process however, presents a new challenge for the 
partner firms due to the sharing of information, resources and technology. Literature has not 
adequately addressed the issues associated with collaborative decision making that has to be 
robust in an environment with varying performance, quality and timing uncertainties, despite the 
growing need to collaborate. In our model, we consider a product development company and a 
technology development company with different but symbiotic capabilities. We analyze various 
scenarios, assessing the benefits and downsides of demand forecast information sharing on each 
company and the supply chain as a whole. The scenarios analyzed vary according to the level of 
technology, innovation and resources shared between the firms.  
 
Keywords: New product development process, Collaboration, Stackelberg game, 
Information sharing. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Globalization has boosted the competition within the marketplace. A new product 
development process in such a scenario has strategic significance as well as repercussions for an 
organization’s performance and competitive position (Langerak, et al., 2005). The 
pharmaceutical sector would be one such case – where the financial bottom line is directly 
affected by the speed of product development (Mohan, et al., 2007), (Gupta, et al., 2007). This 
process is complex and time-consuming (Yan, et al., 2010), with new products taking an average 
of 12 years and several millions of dollars to launch (California Biomedical Research 
Association , 2014). This time-critical issue is compounded by other problems like rapid change 
in technology, global competition, limited budgets and tougher regulations. In response to such 
competitive environment, firms now have to partner up with other firms for their expertise in 
specific disciplines or technologies (Quinn, 2000). Rigel and Neurocrine Biosciences, for 
instance developed a joint relationship to discover novel molecular targets involved in glial cell 
activation. The president and CEO of Rigel elaborates how this partnership benefitted both the 
firms mutually (Gower, 1998). Rigel has now the access to a larger chemical library, which adds 
a significant value to its technology. Neurocrine gets new target discovery and validation based 
on genomics and functional pathway mapping in a target area of strategic interest. 
 
A considerable amount of research literature exists on new product development.  Much 
of it is focused on product development in a single firm, investigated at either the product or 
project levels. Ozer, for example, studied factors influencing decision making in NPD and 
provided guidelines to evaluate the new products in a more confident and accurate way (Ozer, 
2005). Mu et al. analysed the contribution of individuals within new product development teams 
to NPD and its performance (Mu, et al., 2011). There exists ample research concentrating on the 
different aspects of such a process, dealing with improving its performance (Novak & Eppinger, 
2001). In this paper, we analyse various possible relationships between a technology and product 
development company with regard to information, collaboration and innovation sharing. We 
consider the effect of forecast sharing on prices and profits. We also come across some 
deviations from expected results.  
 
It has been argued that information sharing is of vital importance in cross-organizational 
collaboration (Zhijun, 2009) (Zhao, et al., 2002). Many researchers have suggested that making 
an up-to-date and undistorted data available at every point within the supply chain is important. 
Yue and Liu (2005) argue that there are two fundamental ways in which sharing information can 
help the supply chain (Yue & Liu, 2005). Firstly, it enables manufacturers to respond to volatile 
consumer demand by appropriately scheduling production and replenishing retailer inventory, 
and secondly, by improving the accuracy of demand forecast. Better forecasting, in turn, can 
contribute to better price structuring and better inventory management and thus help firms 
produce high-quality products. While information sharing is important within this context, the 
significance of its impact on the performance of a supply chain also depends on what 
information is shared, when, how and with whom it is shared ( (Chizzo, 1998), (Holmberg, 
2000)). 
 
Even though the benefits of information sharing have been well documented in literature, 
they have not been studied adequately with reference to the information sharing between firms 
jointly collaborating to develop a new product. Through this paper, we try to address and analyse 
this in detail. We analyse various collaborative scenarios between a technology and a product 
development company involved in innovation, investment and information sharing. We analyse 
how the firms would handle the demand forecast data based on the type of their collaboration, 
market demand & customer sensitivities, and subsequently arrive at the equilibrium prices and 
the level of innovation. We obtain detailed quantitative solutions for these parameters and 
graphically depict the variation of profit functions of the two firms in these scenarios. In addition 
to a thorough analysis, this paper tries to address the cases where results are not as expected. For 
the academia, this paper provides a basis for further research on collaborative NPD. For 
companies already involved in collaborative NPD we provide a method to optimize their 
parameters according to their collaboration scenario. And for the companies entering into 
collaborative NPD a method to compare various scenarios.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we survey related literature 
on NPD and information sharing. Section 3 builds the model for innovation, demand as well as 
the profit functions. In Section 4 we provide the detailed analysis for each of these scenarios. 
Section 5 and 6 finally present the managerial implications and conclusions respectively. Results 
of all the proofs in the paper are given in the appendix in Section 7. 
 
2. Relevant Literature 
 
As stated previously, an extensive literature exists on the topic of new product development 
process in single firms, investigated at the product and project levels (Bhaskaran & Krishnan, 
2006). The interactions between product and supply chain have emerged as an interesting field ( 
(Rauniar & Rawskib, 2012), (Grahovac & Parker, 2002), (Novak & Eppinger, 2001), (Avag, 
2005) and (Schoenherra & Wagnerb, 2016)). Wang & Shu developed a fuzzy model to evaluate 
the performance of the entire supply chain (Wang & Shu, 2007). Erat and Kavadias (Erat & 
Kavidas, 2006) studied the development of products in an industrial context, their focus being 
the inter-temporal discrimination of a technology supplier through partial adoption of 
technology, while Jayaram (Jayaram, 2007) studied the supplier involvement at length in NPDs 
and their effects. Another strand of literature views the relationship between financial parameters 
of a firm and the NPD process ( (Chen, et al., 2006), (Koufterosa, et al., 2014)).  
 
There has been substantial research considering R&D alliances ( (Ge & Hu, 2008), 
(Amaldoss, et al., 2000), (Dutta & Weiss, 1997)), knowledge management ( (Bradfield & Gao, 
2007), (Lee & Ahn, 2007), (Huang & Liang, 2006) and (Honga, et al., 2011)), but these ignore 
the role of information sharing in the NPD decision making process. More recently, Bhaskaran 
and Krishnan (Bhaskaran & Krishnan, 2005) consider the concept of collaborative NPD in a 
supply chain consisting of an upstream supplier and a downstream manufacturer. Their analysis 
shows that for products with no pre-existing revenues, innovation and investment sharing are 
important. Also, the benefits depend on the extent to which the revenues are shared between the 
firms. And then, the above research is extended by Bhaskaran and Krishnan (Bhaskaran & 
Krishnan, 2006) in which the supply chain they consider consists of two competitive upstream 
suppliers and a downstream manufacturer.  
 
The information sharing literature consists of studies, particularly pioneered by the works of 
Clarke (Clarke, 1983), Gal-Or (Gal-Or, 1985), Li (Li, 1985), Novshek and Sonnenschein 
(Novshek & Sonnenschein, 1982) and Vives (Vives, 1984), that deal with the NPD. This body of 
research focuses on horizontal information sharing among competitors, i.e., whether or not 
competing firms have an incentive to share market sensitive information in an oligopoly 
situation. However, interactions between vertical parties are not considered and hence these 
could only serve as a benchmark. Samaddar et al. (Samaddar, et al., 2006) investigate the 
relationships between the design of a supply network and inter-organizational information 
sharing. Recent studies offer an excellent survey of the literature and points out two areas 
concerning information sharing in supply chains. Firstly, in case of information asymmetry 
between the players in the supply chain, members are prompted to engage in screening and 
signaling. This stream of research evaluates the value of information in improving operational 
performance (see, (Cachon & Fisher, 2000), (Chiang & Trappey, 2007), (Wang, et al., 2013), 
(Titah, et al., 2016)) and mostly a channel structure with one supplier and one retailer is 
considered. The second area considers information sharing in a channel structure of many 
competing retailers and one supplier ( (Li, 2002), (Zhang, 2002), (Li & Zhang, 2008)).  
 From the NPD and information sharing literature, it is thus clear that adequate research 
doesn’t exist addressing the role and effects of information sharing in a new product 
development process. In this research, we introduce information sharing into the existing NPD 
supply chain literature and investigate the effect of information sharing in a collaborative NPD 
process. 
 
3. The Model 
We shall now discuss the background and framework for our model. Let’s say one of the 
firms comes up with the idea for a new product, but doesn’t have sufficient infrastructure of its 
own to carry out the manufacturing. It therefore decides to outsource the manufacturing role to 
another firm, which happens to be an established player in the market, with sufficient 
infrastructure base of its own. We refer to the former as the Product Development Company 
(PDC) and latter as the Technology Development Company (TDC). Through this arrangement, 
both the firms engage in a collaborative new product development process. 
 
The supply chain, made up of one PDC and one TDC is as shown in Figure 1. In our 
model we consider the case of a new product which has an improved performance in certain key 
dimensions and this improved quality has the potential to increase end-customer demand. For 
this the PDC, as stated earlier, needs input from a specialist firm TDC, which actually engages in 
the development of the product. In this model, thus, the TDC sets the wholesale price (ω) at 
which the product is sold to PDC and also decides the innovation level of the product (θ), being 
the one actually involved in the product development. The PDC in turn sets the retail price (p) at 
which it finally markets the developed product. The market forecast (denoted by f), we assume is 
being determined by the PDC since it is the one which finally markets the product. The decision 
variables are chosen by both the TDC and the PDC so as to maximize the profits. 
 
A key feature in this game is that one of the players i.e. TDC is the firm deciding the level of 
innovation (θ) for the product. This provides it with a strategic advantage over the partner firm 
PDC, thereby causing PDC to have to observe TDC’s move before arriving at its own decision 
variables. The modeling of this scenario therefore demands the use of a Stackelberg game. This 
is because here TDC is aware of the fact that PDC observes its move, before deciding its own. 
Being a Stackelberg player (leader for TDC) in this case, would result in higher profits than a 
Nash bargaining game. Hence TDC would tend to make this a Stackelberg game while engaging 
in the new product development process (Shiau & Michalek, 2009). This is so because the leader 
(if aware of his position) always benefits by playing a Stackelberg leader rather than playing a 
naïve Nash player (Choi, et al., 1990), (Wang, et al., 2016). 
 
Thus, in this model, the TDC acts as the Stackelberg leader and the PDC the Stackelberg 
follower. In such a setting, we now analyze the effects of sharing forecast information (f) 
between the firms, on individual profits as well as on that of the supply chain as a whole. To 
derive the optimal decisions, we assume both TDC and PDC know the equilibrium strategies of 
the other firm and neither of them has anything to gain by changing its own strategy unilaterally. 
We assume both TDC and PDC to be rational firms. 
TDC PDC
Invest in a Key 
Technology
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Figure 1: The Model 
 
3.1 Model of Innovation 
We model innovation as an attribute that does not increase the firms’ marginal cost at the 
expense of quality. These improvements are referred to as innovation quality dimensions 
(Abbott, 1953). The required level of innovation (θ) is decided by the firm, and therefore the cost 
associated with developing the product and the cost for deploying the resources to achieve this 
innovation is incurred.  
 
There is an upfront investment equal to the fixed cost of investment which is a function 
of the level of innovation θ.  We assume that this cost is nI , where I is the innovation 
investment parameter and n =2. This value of n is assumed in line with findings from (Bhaskaran 
& Krishnan, 2005), as the cost of innovation is convex with respect to the level of quality 
improvement. Another component is the variable development cost which is dependent on the 
time taken to develop the innovation (Bhaskaran & Krishnan, 2006) and hence is taken to be 
equal to c T . Hence the total cost of development is equal to: 
Cost of development = 2I c T   (1) 
 
3.2 Model of Demand 
We model the end-customer demand as a linear demand function, which has been used 
extensively in the previous literature (refer to (Ray, 2005), (Tsay & Agrawal, 2000) and 
references therein). The end-customer demand here is a variation of negatively sloped demand 
function which incorporates the customer’s demand for an improved/higher quality i.e. TDC’s 
innovation increases product quality, stimulates demand and shifts it upwards by a factor d . So, 
when p is the retail price of the goods, the quantity of the goods made available in the market, Q, 
is defined as follow, 
,     0, 0,  0Q a bp d a b c          (2) 
here, a, b and d represent the total market potential and the sensitivity of the customers towards 
price and innovation levels, respectively. 
 3.3   Model for Information Structure 
We assume the base level of demand ‘a’ to be a random variable to capture the 
uncertainties in demand pertaining to the changes in business and economic conditions. For 
example, the demand for Toprol-XL, a hypertension and heart disease drug, by AstraZeneca was 
not known with certainty, at the time of introduction and could be affected by a number of 
factors. Sales figures in the US for Toprol-XL increased by 59% after two of AstraZeneca’s 
competitors have had to withdraw generic products from the market (Financial Times, 2009 
(Financial Times, 2009)). We try to incorporate such uncertainties by considering ‘a’ as a 
random variable. These factors are monitored by many firms on a regular basis, which helps 
them keep track of the uncontrollable elements of industry demand. 
 Thus, more specifically, we assume 
𝑎 = 𝑎0 + 𝑒 (3) 
where, 0a  is the mean base level demand and e is the error term assumed to have a normal 
distribution with 20 and V   . Thus, 
2
0[( ) ]E a a V   (Raju & Roy, 2000). The normality 
assumption associated with equation 3, is widely used in literature due to its simplicity. The 
demand uncertainty term is used as an unknown additive intercept (Vives, 1984). 
 
The PDC uses its market information gathering techniques as well as the known 
uncertain market demand (a) to make a forecast. We assume the forecast of the PDC to be: 
𝑓 = 𝑎 + 𝜀 (4) 
where ε is independent of a and has a normal distribution, with 𝜇 = 0 and 𝜎2 = 𝑠. A higher 
(lower) variance implies a less (more) precise forecast.  
The precision parameter is given by 𝑡 = 𝑉/(𝑉 + 𝑠) and is inversely proportional to the error 
variances (Yue, et al., 2006). In line with findings of the existing literature (e.g., (Vives, 1984), 
(Raju & Roy, 2000), (Li, 2002)), all the parameters of the model (except the forecast) are 
assumed to be of common knowledge to both the firms. If PDC decides to disclose information 
about demand (f) to TDC, we can state that an information sharing agreement has been reached 
between the two firms. We then rationally assume that TDC will use this information (f) to 
derive the wholesale price (𝜔). 
Case 1: No Information Sharing, No Collaborative NPD, No Innovation Sharing (NNN) 
In the NNN strategy, none of the information, investment or innovation is shared between the 
firms. Equations 5 and 6 give the profit functions for the PDC and the TDC respectively. Note 
the conditional expectation in case of PDC. 
     NNNPDCE f E p a bp d f        (5) 
    2NNNTDC TDCE E a bp d I c T          (6) 
 
Case 2: No Information Sharing, Collaborative NPD and No innovation Sharing (NCN) 
 
Case 2 is similar in nature to case 1, where no information or innovation is shared between the 
firms. However in this decentralized channel the PDC agrees to share a fraction of the total 
investment costs (ϰ) in the technology or service development. If the innovation is successful, 
the PDC is charged a technology price (ω) for every component procured from the TDC. Profit 
functions are given by equations 7 and 8. 
     2( )NCNPDC TDCE f E p a bp d I c T f             (7) 
        21 1NCNTDC TDCE E a bp d I c T               (8) 
 
Case 3: Information Sharing, No Collaborative NPD and No Innovation Sharing (INN) 
In case 3, we assume PDC is willing to share the demand forecast data (f) with the TDC and 
hence note the conditional expectation for TDC. However, there are no investment costs or 
innovation works undertaken by the PDC. Profit functions are given by equations 9 and 10. 
     INNPDCE f E p a bp d f         (9) 
    2( )INNTDC TDCE f E a bp d I c T f                     (10) 
 
Case 4: Information Sharing, Collaborative NPD and No Innovation Sharing (ICN) 
In case 4, PDC is willing to share the demand forecast data (f) with the TDC. The PDC 
also agrees to share a fraction of the total investment costs (ϰ) in the technology or service 
development but doesn’t take part in innovation work and if the innovation is successful it is 
charged a technology price (ω) for every component procured from the TDC. Profit functions are 
given by equations 11 and 12. 
     2( )ICNPDC TDCE f E p a bp d I c T f                 (11) 
      2( 1 (1 ) )ICNTDC TDCE f E a bp d I c T f               (12) 
 
Case 5: No Information Sharing, No Collaborative NPD and Innovation Sharing (NNI) 
 
In the NNI strategy, though no information or investment is shared, the PDC shares a part 
of the innovation work ( y ) with the TDC and hence is also involved in development work 
along with TDC. Profit functions are given by equations 13 and 14.  
     2( ( ) )NNIPDC PDCE f E p a bp d I y c yT f           (13) 
    2((1 ) ) (1 )NNITDC TDCE E a bp d I y c y T                            (14) 
 
Case 6: No Information Sharing, Collaborative NPD and Innovation Sharing (NCI) 
 
 In the NCI strategy, though no forecast information is shared, the PDC shares a part of 
the innovation work with the TDC and also shares a part of investment with PDC. The profit 
functions are given as in equations 15 and 16. 
     2 2( ( ) ((1 ) ) (1 ) )NCIPDC PDC TDCE f E p a bp d I y cy T I y c y T f                    (15) 
        21 ((1 ) ) 1 (1 )NCITDC TDCE E a bp d I y c y T                          (16) 
 
Case 7: Information Sharing, No Collaborative NPD and Innovation Sharing (INI) 
In the INI strategy, PDC agrees to conduct part of innovation (y) itself and also share the 
forecast information with TDC. The profit functions would be given by equations 17 and 18. 
     2( ( ) )INIPDC PDCE f E p a bp d I y c yT f                  (17) 
    2( ((1 ) ) (1 ) )INITDC TDCE f E a bp d I y c y T f                  (18) 
 
Case 8: Information Sharing, Collaborative NPD and Innovation Sharing (ICI) 
 
In the ICI strategy, the PDC shares innovation and investment with TDC and also shares 
the forecast information. The profit functions are as in equations 19 & 20. 
     2 2( ( ) ((1 ) ) (1 ) )ICIPDC PDC TDCE f E p a bp d I y cy T I y c y T f                       (19) 
      2( 1 ((1 ) ) (1 ) (1 ) )ICITDC TDCE f E a bp d I y c y T f                             (20) 
 
4. Analysis 
As can be inferred from Fig 2, there are basic four different strategies in which two firms 
involving in a new product development process can collaborate based on which of the 
investment or innovation is shared.  
 
1. No collaboration (No investment/innovation sharing) 
2. Pure Investment sharing (No innovation sharing) 
3. Pure Innovation sharing (No investment sharing) 
4. Combined Investment & Innovation sharing    
 
  
Figure 2: Profit Functions 
Now, depending on whether or not the forecast information is shared in these 4 cases, we 
arrive at the eight possible strategies enlisted in the previous section. We will now analyze the 
effect of sharing forecast information in each of the above four strategies. 
 
4.1 No Collaboration Scenario 
Scenario 1 represents cases 1 and 3. The sequence of actions for this scenario is 
represented in Figure 3. We derive the optimal retail price (p), wholesale price (ω), innovation 
level (θ) and profits in the two situations:  
(1) when information is not shared by the firms; (2) when information is shared by the firms. 
 
 
Figure 3: Sequence of actions in a no collaboration scenario 
4.1.1. No Information Sharing 
Both the PDC and TDC maximize their profits as shown in equations 5 and 6. Since TDC is 
the leader and PDC is the follower in this Stackelberg game, we derive the optimal solution by 
first deriving the optimal θ and ω followed by the optimal p. We obtain the following result. 
   
Result 1: The optimal wholesale price and the optimal level of innovation for the TDC are 
not related to the forecast of the PDC, for the Stackelberg model with no information sharing and 
no collaborative NPD at the equilibrium. Table 1 shows the optimal values of retail price and 
wholesale price, level of innovation and expected profits for PDC and TDC in a no collaboration 
and no information sharing scenario. 
 
Table 1: Optimal values for no information sharing and no collaborative NPD strategy 
Variable Value 
NNNp  
      
 
2 2
0 0
2
8 1 4 6
2 8
TDCbI d t a tf a d bI dbcT
b bI d
     

 
NNN  0 2
4 2
8
TDCIa dcT
bI d


 
NNN  0 2
4
8
TDCda bcT
bI d


 
NNN
PDCE  
 
 
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0 0
2
2
16 8 16 4
4 8
TDC TDCb I a Vt bI d a Ib dcT b d c T
b bI d
   

 
NNN
TDCE  
2 2 2
0 0
2
2
8
TDC TDCIa a dcT bc T
bI d
 

 
 
 
Proof: Given the following values: sharing level ϰ, wholesale price ω and innovation level 
θ, the PDC determines the retail price (p) that maximizes its anticipated profit (equation 5). 
Taking the first order condition (FOC), we get  
 
  2 0
NNN
PDCE f
E a bp d b
p
 
 
    

        (21) 
As can be seen the second order condition (SOC) is negative, which implies that the profit 
function of the PDC is concave in p. We can obtain the value of p from equation 21 as:   
  0,
2
a d b
p
b
 
 
 
                  (22) 
The TDC forecasts the retail price of PDC as      0E p   a d b / 2b     (from (22)), in the 
absence of the forecast data. When this is substituted into the profit function of the TDC, we can 
obtain the optimal innovation level and wholesale price from the TDC’s profit function through 
the two FOCs (∂E(ΠTDC)/∂ω=0 and ∂E(ΠTDC)/∂θ=0), and are given by  
0
2
4 2
8
NNN TDCa I dcT
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   (23) 
As can be noted from (23), the two parameters for the TDC at equilibrium are not related to the 
forecast of the PDC. This is because the PDC does not share its forecast information with the 
TDC, and the TDC has to make its decisions by using only the available market information. 
 
On the other hand, it is evident from Table 1 that the optimal price of the PDC is dependent 
on market information and forecast and also an increasing function of the PDC forecast data. 
This implies that if the PDC is optimistic about the market potential it would set a higher retail 
price and vice versa. We also notice that the quality of forecast directly affects the profitability of 
the PDC as would be expected.  
 
Result 2: The expected equilibrium profit of the TDC in this situation is independent of the 
market forecast level as well as forecast accuracy while that of PDC increases with forecast 
accuracy. (Fig 4). 
 
Figure 4: Variation of profits with forecast accuracy 
(No information sharing in a no collaboration scenario) 
 
We now contrast the optimal values (from table 1) with the case where PDC shares forecast 
information with TDC. 
 
4.1.2Information Sharing 
 
In this scenario, the PDC shares the market forecast data with the TDC before making 
any decisions. The PDC and the TDC maximize their profit functions as given in equations 9 and 
10 and the following result holds at the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
    Result 3: The optimal wholesale price and the optimal level of innovation for the TDC are 
related to both the forecast level and forecast accuracy of the PDC. Table 2 shows the optimal 
values of parameters for both the TDC and the PDC in an information sharing and no 
collaborative NPD environment at the equilibrium. 
 
Table 2: Optimal values for information sharing and no collaborative NPD strategy 
 
 
As is evident from table 2, the structure of the optimal values for the information sharing 
situation is similar to the no information sharing situation in table 1. The major difference 
observed is that the optimal wholesale price and the optimal level of innovation are now both 
related to the forecast of the PDC.  
  
4.1.3 Value of Information Sharing 
We use the profit expressions from tables 1 and 2 to observe the impact information sharing 
has on each firm’s performance in case of a non-collaborative NPD. The value of information 
sharing to the PDC and TDC in both the collaborative NPD situation can be interpreted from the 
following: 
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Result 4: The value of information sharing to the TDC is always positive as can be seen 
from the above equation (25). On the other hand, the value of information sharing to the PDC is 
positive iff. 
2 2
12 4
d d
I
b b
        (26) 
Result 4 presents some interesting and important observations. The value of information 
sharing being positive for the NPD is intuitive, because in this situation, the TDC sets the 
wholesale price and makes all innovation decisions after knowing the PDC’s market forecast 
data. However, as shown in our model, this has implications for the PDC, who might see a 
decrease in profit (when.     2 212 , 4I d b d b ). This is because the TDC maximizes its own profit 
at the expense of the PDC by using the market forecast information strategically. Equation 26 
implies that the investment parameter should be moderate, i.e.     2 212 , 4I d b d b . Under this 
condition, the PDC has an incentive to share forecast information with the TDC and would lead 
to mutual benefits for the two. 
 
  Another set of findings and their interpretation, drawn for the two situations of sharing and not 
sharing information, are as follows: 
 
Result 5: If 0f a , then,
INN NNNp p , INN NNN   and INN NNN  ; and if 0f a , then, 
INN NNNp p , INN NNN   and INN NNN  . 
 If PDC is optimistic about the market potential demand (e.g., f≥ a0) the PDC will set a high 
retail price (p) in an information sharing situation. The TDC on the other hand will set higher 
wholesale price ( ) which will affect the PDC’s profitability. Furthermore, the TDC will make 
a higher level of innovation (θ) in an information sharing case, which indicates that there is an 
incentive for the TDC, when the PDC is optimistic about the market potential demand. 
 
We also try to graphically observe the relative values of the profits of the two firms in both 
cases. The values for the coefficients have been taken so as to mirror the real world scenario. The 
parameters are mostly product/drug specific and need to be calculated separately for each drug. 
The percentage increase in the demand of a drug over its predecessor is an indicator of its level 
of innovation and hence has been taken as the proxy for the drug’s θ. The cost of development of 
a drug along with the actual time for its development is used to calculate constants of equation 1. 
Similarly, the price of the drug and its sales (customer base) are used to calculate the sensitivity 
constants in equation 2. Fig 5 represents the plots using parameters corresponding to those of a 
drug Brintellix. We can note from Fig 5 that the value of information sharing to the supply chain 
is slightly positive in the no-collaboration scenario. Using the parameter values corresponding to 
different drugs, gives similar relative positions for the graphs of PDC profit and TDC profit for 
the two cases. As can be seen, the value of information sharing is positive to the PDC in the 
middle range, but decreases at extreme values of b on either side. 
  
Figure 5: Comparison of profits with/without information sharing in no collaboration scenario 
4.2 Pure Investment Sharing Scenario 
The sequence of actions for this scenario, which represents cases 2 and 4, is represented in 
Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Sequence of actions in a pure investment sharing scenario 
We derive the level of investment sharing (χ), wholesale price ( ), optimal retail price (p), 
innovation level (θ) and profits in two situations:  
(1) when information is not shared by the firms;  (2) when information is shared by the firms.  
 
4.2.1 No Information Sharing 
In this scenario, the PDC and the TDC maximize profit as per equations 7 and 8. We 
prove the following result. 
 
   Result 6: The forecast information (f) or the forecast accuracy (t) does not influence PDC’s 
equilibrium contribution ϰ in the investment sharing, in the no information sharing case in pure 
investment sharing scenario. 
 
Proof: Given the following values: sharing level ϰ, wholesale price ω and innovation level 
θ, the PDC determines the retail price (p) that maximizes its anticipated profit (equation 7). 
Taking the first order condition (FOC), we get  
 
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As can be seen the second order condition (SOC) is negative, which implies that the profit 
function of the PDC is concave in p. We can obtain value of p as   
 
 
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The TDC forecasts the retail price of PDC as      0E p   a d b / 2b    , in the absence 
of the forecast data. If this value is substituted into the profit function of the TDC, we can obtain 
the optimal innovation level and wholesale price from the PDC’s profit function which are given 
by  
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Substituting values from equation (27) into the profit function of the PDC in equation (7), we get 
              2, ,NCNPDC PDCE f E p a bp d I c T f                    
From the FOC, we obtain the optimal sharing level as: 
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where, 
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 We observe that the equilibrium value of χ is independent of demand forecast (f) or the 
forecast accuracy (t). This demonstrates that PDC’s share in the investment at the equilibrium 
remains unaffected by the variations of the demand forecast and also the accuracy in determining 
this forecast data. This may be attributed to the lack of information sharing which leads to ω and 
θ being independent of f and t at the equilibrium, resulting in equilibrium ϰ being independent.  
 
4.2.2 Information Sharing 
 
In this scenario, the PDC shares the market forecast data with the TDC before making any 
decisions. The PDC and the TDC maximize their profit functions as given in equations 11 and 
12.  
 
Result 7: Table 3 shows the optimal Stackelberg parameters for both the TDC and the PDC 
with information sharing in pure investment sharing scenario in the decentralized supply chain at 
the equilibrium. Sharing level ϰ, wholesale price ω and innovation level θ are dependent on the 
forecast level and accuracy.  
Table 3: Optimal values for information sharing case in a pure investment sharing NPD strategy 
 
where, 
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 4.2.3 Value of information sharing 
 
To compare the effect of information sharing on the profits of individual firms in this 
case, we use plots of the profit functions obtained for the firms in the two cases, as well as the 
total chain profits. The profit functions are plotted against customer sensitivity towards price (b). 
As before, the relative positions of the profit curves for a firm are indifferent to the drug 
considered. Following results are thus observed from the plots. 
 
   Result 8:  For a pure investment sharing scenario, the total chain profit is greater when 
information is shared between the firms. (Fig 7) 
 
 
Figure 7: Comparison of profits with/without information sharing in pure investment sharing scenario  
(Brintellix) 
 
As is evident from Fig 7, the profits for the PDC remain higher in the no-information sharing 
case while the opposite holds true for TDC. The decrease in the profits for PDC is however more 
than compensated by the increase in the profits for TDC in the information sharing case leading 
to overall higher profits for the supply chain when information is shared between the two firms. 
The analysis of this model hence suggests that the information sharing in the pure investment 
sharing scenario would lead to higher profits in the collaboration. 
 
4.3 Pure Innovation Sharing Scenario 
This scenario constitutes cases 5 and 7. The sequence of actions for this scenario is represented 
in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Sequence of actions in a pure innovation sharing scenario 
We again try to derive the optimal retail price (p), wholesale price ( ), innovation level (θ) 
and profits in the two situations: 
 (1) when information is not shared by the firms; (2) when information is shared by the firms. 
 
4.3.1 No Information Sharing 
Here, both firms (PDC and TDC) maximize their profits as per equations 13 and 14. We can 
derive the optimal Stackelberg solution by deriving optimal p and using it to get optimal ω and θ. 
The following result holds. 
 
Result 9: The forecast information (f) or the forecast accuracy (t) does not influence PDC’s 
equilibrium contribution y in the investment sharing, in the no information sharing case in pure 
innovation sharing scenario. 
 
Proof: Given the following values: sharing level y, wholesale price ω and innovation level 
θ, PDC determines the retail price (p) that maximizes its anticipated profit (equation 13). Using 
first order condition, we get  
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As can be therefore seen the second order condition is negative, which implies that the profit 
function of the PDC is concave in p. We can obtain value of p as   
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The TDC forecasts the retail price of PDC as      0E p   a d b / 2b    , in the 
absence of the forecast data. If this is substituted into the profit function of the TDC, we can 
obtain the optimal innovation level and wholesale price from the PDC’s profit function which are 
given by  
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   (28) 
 
Substituting these values from equation (28), we get the profit function of the PDC and TDC as 
given in Table 4.    
 
Table 4: Optimal values for no information sharing case in a pure innovation sharing NPD 
strategy 
 
 
The value of y is provided in Appendix along with proof of these results. 
 
This result thus shows that the PDC’s equilibrium decision regarding its share in the innovation 
efforts remains unaffected by the variations of the demand forecast and also the accuracy in 
predicting the data. This can again be attributed to lack of information sharing with TDC leading 
to the equilibrium ω and θ being independent of f and t, causing equilibrium y to behave 
similarly.  
 
4.3.2 Information Sharing 
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In this scenario, the PDC shares the market forecast data with the TDC before making any 
decisions. The PDC and the TDC maximize their profit functions as given in equations 17 and 
18. We show that the following result holds. 
 
Result 10: Table 5 enlists the Bayesian Stackelberg optimal parameters and the expected 
profits for both the firms with information sharing in pure innovation sharing scenario at the 
equilibrium. Equilibrium constant in investment sharing y, wholesale price ω and innovation 
level θ are dependent on the forecast level and accuracy 
 
Table 5: Optimal values for information sharing case in a pure innovation sharing NPD strategy 
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The value of y is provided in Appendix along with proof of these results. 
 
4.3.3 Value of information sharing 
To compare the effect of information sharing on the profits of individual firms, the plots 
of the profit functions obtained for the firms in the two cases, as well as the total chain profits are 
studied. Fig 9 below represents the profit function plots against customer sensitivity towards 
price (b) for the drug Brintellix. Parameters corresponding to the different drugs cause no change 
in the relative position of profits in the two cases.  
 
  Result 11: For a pure innovation sharing scenario, the total chain profit is greater when 
information is shared between the firms. (Fig 9) 
  
Figure 9: Comparison of profits with/without information sharing in pure innovation sharing scenario 
As evident from Fig 9, the profit for PDC is greater in the no information sharing case 
while for the TDC it’s greater for the information sharing scenario. The total chain profit is 
however greater when information is shared between PDC and TDC. 
     It is thus implied that in the pure innovation sharing scenario, information would be shared 
between the two firms so that the total profit for the supply chain be maximized. 
 
4.4 Combined Investment & Innovation sharing scenario 
This represents cases 6 and 8. The sequence of actions for this scenario is represented in Fig10. 
 
Figure 10: Sequence of actions in a combined investment-innovation sharing scenario 
We derive the optimal retail price (p), innovation level (θ), wholesale price ( ) and profits in 
two situations: (1) when information is not shared by the firms; (2) when information is shared 
by the firms. 
 
4.4.1 No Information Sharing 
 
Here, both firms maximize their profits as per equations 15 and 16. Optimal solution by 
deriving optimal p followed by optimal   and θ. (Proof provided in the Appendix) 
 
Result 12: Table 6 provides the equilibrium Stackelberg retail price, innovation level and 
wholesale price with no information sharing in a combined investment and innovation sharing 
NPD scenario in a decentralized supply chain. As expected wholesale price ω and innovation 
level θ are independent of the forecast level and accuracy. 
 
Table 6: Optimal values for no information sharing with combined investment-innovation sharing 
 
 
4.4.2 Information Sharing 
In this scenario, the PDC shares the market forecast data with the TDC before making any 
decisions. The PDC and the TDC maximize their profit functions as given in equations 19 and 
20.  
 
Result 13: Table 7 gives the Stackelberg retail price, innovation level and wholesale price with 
information sharing in a combined investment and innovation sharing NPD scenario in a 
decentralized supply chain at the equilibrium. Wholesale price ω and innovation level θ are 
dependent on the forecast level and accuracy. 
 
Table 7: Optimal values for information sharing case with combined investment-innovation sharing 
Variable Value 
NCIp  
     
  
 
2
0 0 0
2
0 0
2 2 2
(1 )( 4  (1 2 )(2 1 ) 6 (1 )) 4 (2 1 )
                                                      ( 1 )
2 8 8 16 8 8
TDCIb y t a tf z dcT y by I t a tf a
d t a tf a
b d bI xIb Iby y Ib y Ib


           
   
    
 
NCI  
0 0
2 2 2
2 (1 ) (1 ) (2 2 )
8 8 16 16 8 8
TDCy Iya dcT Ia
d bI Ib Iyb I yb y Ib Ib y

  
   
     
 
NCI  
0
2 2 2
4 4 4 4
8 8 16 16 8 8
TDC TDC TDC TDCbcT a d bcT bcT y bcT y
d bI Ib Iyb I yb y Ib Ib y
 
  
   
     
 
Variable Value 
  
4.3.3 Value of information sharing 
To compare the effect of information sharing on the profits of individual firms, we consider the 
profit functions for the firms obtained for the two cases, as well as the total chain profit. The 
profit functions in this case, however give plots whose relative positions differ highly with 
parameters corresponding to different drugs. It may be thus inferred from above, that the value of 
information sharing in case of a collaborative investment and innovation sharing is prominently 
dependent on the drug under consideration and seems to vary across different cases rendering it 
inappropriate to conclude in general  of the value of information sharing. 
 
  Result 14:  For a collaborative investment and innovation sharing scenario, the total chain 
profits vary depending on the parameter values according to which the total chain profit in the 
information sharing case may either be greater or lesser relative to when information is not 
shared between the firms. 
 
     The collaborative investment and innovation sharing scenario thus would require some 
additional analysis and cautious consideration as the effect of information sharing varies greatly 
with the particular product being considered. 
 
5. Managerial Implications 
  Through analyzing the model of a collaborative NPD so developed, we notice that in the 
non-collaborative case with no information sharing (scenario 1), the expected equilibrium profit 
of the TDC (as well as ω and θ) is independent of the accuracy of the market demand forecast, 
while that of the PDC increases proportionately (result 2). This would cause the managers at 
PDC to essentially invest to improve their forecast accuracy, as it leads to a definite increase in 
the profits for the PDC with no corresponding increase in the wholesale price ω by TDC.  
However, the expected equilibrium profits for both the PDC and the TDC (along with ω and θ) 
are increasing functions of the accuracy of the market forecast in the information sharing 
situation.   
 
ICIp  
     
 
0 0
2 2 2
3(1 )(1 )(2 1 2 1 )
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TDCy t a tf Iy dcT t a tf I
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
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    
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     
 
ICI  
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4 1 4 4 4
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  
     
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We further derive that in the no collaboration scenario (result 5), the level of innovation 
input by the TDC is greater in the information sharing case, when PDC is optimistic about the 
market demand. However, opposite is true when the PDC demand forecast is lower than the base 
demand a0. This would cause the managers at the PDC to be willing to share the forecast 
information with their counterparts at TDC when they are optimistic about it, but will prefer not 
sharing it otherwise, so as to achieve higher levels of innovation in the product. 
 
Also, we find that for the pure investment sharing scenario (scenario 2), sharing forecast 
information with the TDC decreases the individual profits of PDC but increases the profit of the 
supply chain as a whole (result 8). The managers at the PDC in such situation would still choose 
to share the information with TDC, as the increased profits of supply chain (TDC in particular) 
could be reinvested to further improve the level of innovation and would be beneficial for the 
collaboration in the long run. The pure innovation sharing scenario (scenario 3) provides similar 
results where managers at the PDC would be motivated to share the market forecast information 
with the TDC. 
 
  For the combined investment-innovation scenario (scenario 4), sharing market forecast 
information with the TDC provided varying results depending on the drug under consideration. 
Hence such a scenario doesn’t yield generalized results with respect to the value of information 
sharing and would require further deliberation on part of the managers.   
 
6. Conclusion 
Literature on new product development has focused on the level of NPD for a single firm 
or collaborative NPD between two firms, but ignores the role and the impact of information 
sharing in the collaborative new product development process. In this paper, we analytically 
study the effects of sharing demand forecast information on a NPD supply chain in the 
pharmaceutical industry, consisting of two firms- Technology Development Company and 
Product Development Company, based on a Stackelberg game model developed. 
 
The paper broadly enlists all the possible ways in which the two firms can collaborate to 
participate in a new product development process. For each relationship, we analyze in depth 
how the PDC and TDC would handle demand forecast data based on the type of their 
collaboration, market demand & customer sensitivities, and subsequently arrive at the 
equilibrium prices and the level of innovation. Further, we arrive at the detailed quantitative 
solutions for each of the above parameters in the eight possible scenarios and also try to 
graphically depict the variation of profit functions of the two firms in these scenarios.  
 
 The research from this paper can readily be extended to other industries with suitable 
modifications to the demand and pricing functions. Another stream of research could deal with 
the sharing of information besides that of demand forecast and their subsequent effects on the 
collaboration and the price levels and innovation level. The research in the paper attempts to 
analyze quantitatively (through Stackelberg game model) and qualitatively (through its 
managerial implications) the effect of forecast information sharing in a joint new product 
development process in the pharmaceutical industry; and could ably serve as the framework for 
further research in collaborative new product development. 
 7.  Appendix 
Proof for Result 1: 
 We can find the optimal decisions of PDC and TDC by backward induction. Firstly, given 
wholesale price   and innovation level  , the PDC determines retail price p  that maximizes 
equation (4). The first order condition (FOC) is 
 
  2 0
NNN
PDCdE f
E a f bp d b
dp
 

      (A1) 
where     01E a f t a tf   . Note that   01 t a tf   captures a consensus prediction of the total 
market potential using PDC’s information and the prior information ( 0a ). The second-order 
condition is negative and hence the profit function of the PDC is concave in p . We can obtain  
 
 
,
2
E a f d b
p
b
 
 
 
         (A2) 
 The TDC forecasts the retail price of the PDC as      0 2E p a d b b     when the PDC 
doesn’t share its forecast with the TDC. Substituting this into the profit function of the TDC, we 
can solve for the optimal innovation level and wholesale price from PDC’s profit function which 
are respectively 
0
2
4 2
8
NNN TDCIa dcT
bI d




; 0
2
4
8
NNN TDCda bcT
bI d




 (A3) 
 We need 28 0bI d   in order that the profit function in decentralized supply is jointly concave in 
  and  . Substituting these back into equation (A1), we get the optimal retail price is 
      
 
2 2
0 0
2
8 1 4 6
2 8
TDCNNN
bI d t a tf a d bI dbcT
p
b bI d
     


            (A4) 
Substituting equations (A3) and (A4) into the profit functions of the PDC, the TDC and supply 
chain, we get the optimal expected profits of the PDC, the TDC and supply chain are given in 
table 1. 
 
Proof for Result 2: 
 Differentiating NNNPDCE  and 
NNN
TDCE  with respect to t , we get 0
NNN
PDCE t     and 0
NNN
TDCE t    . 
Proof for Result 3: 
  We can find the optimal decisions of the PDC and the TDC similarly by backward induction. 
The optimal response function is given by equation (A2). The TDC forecasts the retail price of 
the PDC is       2E p f E a f d b b    , where     01E a f t a tf   , when the PDC shares his 
forecast with the TDC. Substituting this into the profit function of the TDC, we can solve for the 
optimal innovation level and wholesale price from the PDC’s profit function are given in table 2. 
 
Proof for Result 4  
This can be inferred directly from equations 24 and 25. 
 
Proof for Result 5 
 This can be inferred directly from the values of p, ω and θ provided in tables 1 and 2. 
 
Proof for Result 7 
  The optimal decisions for the information sharing case can be found similarly as in Result 6. 
TDC in this case forecasts the retail price as       2E p f E a f d b b     where
    01E a f t a tf   . On substituting into TDC’s profit function, we can solve for the optimal 
innovation level and wholesale price. We use these to subsequently arrive at profit function 
values as given in table 3. 
 
Proof for Result 8 
  This is found using the profit functions derived for the PDC and the TDC for the no information 
sharing and information sharing case and plotted using the values a0=30, d=1, I=2, TTDC=3, 
V=10, c=20, t=0.7, TPDC=2. 
 
Proof for Result 9 
y is a root of the equation : 
2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 4 2 2 2 2
0 0((32 64 256 256 ) (48TDC PDC PDC TDC TDC TDCb dcT a I cT b a dI c T b T I I b c T y b d c T I   
2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 3
0 0 0-128 -768 128 64 -1024 ) (12PDC TDC TDC PDC TDC PDC TDC TDCcT b a dI I b c T b dcT a I c T b T d I c T b T I y bd cT a I  
2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2
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2 4 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2
0 0 0 0((-8 128 8 -64 256 - 256PDC TDC PDC TDC TDC TDCc T bT d cT b a dI bd cT a I a I bd b dcT a I I b c T   
2 3 2 2 4 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0 0-1024 2 -16 - 2 -16 192 ) 16 PDC TDC PDC TDC TDC PDC TDC TDCc T b T I a d I cT ba d I bd c T b d c T I c T b T d I y b d c T I  
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2 3 2 5 2 2 2 2 2
0 0 0256 - -64 16 ) 0PDC TDC PDC PDCc T b T I cT a d cT b a dk a I bd    
  This is found using the profit functions derived for the PDC and the TDC for the no information 
sharing and information sharing case and plotted using the values a0=30, d=1, I=2, TTDC=3, 
V=10, c=20, t=0.7, TPDC=2.  
 
Proof for Result 10 
y is a root of the equation: 
2 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2
0 0((256 256 64 32 ) (48TDC PDC TDC PDC TDC TDCI b c T c T b T I cT dI b a I b dcT a b d c T Iy   
2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3
0 0-768 64 128 -128 -1024 )TDC PDC TDC TDC PDC PDC TDCI b c T c T b T d I b dcT a I cT dI b a c T b T I y 
2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0(48 -384 768 -192 - 48TDC TDC PDC TDC TDCbI tVd b dcT a I I b c T c T b T d I Ib d c T  
2 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 4
0 0 0 048 1536 12 ) ((128 2PDC TDC TDC PDCba I d c T b T I bd cT a I y cT dI b a Ia d   
3 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 2 2 2 4
0 0 08 -16 -64 - 256 - 2 -8TDC PDC TDC TDC PDC TDCbd cT a I cT bd a I bI a d I b c T bd c T c T bT d
4 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
02 192 -1024 256 -16 -64 )PDC TDC PDC TDC TDC TDCId tV c T b T d I c T b T I b dcT a I b d c T I bI t Vd y  
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2
0 0 0 02 16 - 16 -32 16 16TDC TDC PDC TDC PDCbd c T Ib d c T cT a d bI a d I b dcT a cT d ba I bI tVd    
2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 4
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  The optimal decisions for the information sharing case can be found similarly as in Result 9. 
TDC in this case forecasts the retail price as       2E p f E a f d b b     where
    01E a f t a tf   . Substituting this into the profit function for TDC, we solve for the optimal 
innovation level and wholesale price, which yields values of profit functions as given in table 5. 
 
Proof for Result 11 
 This is found using the profit functions derived for the PDC and the TDC for the no information 
sharing and information sharing case and plotted using the values a0=30, d=1, I=2, TTDC=3, 
V=10, c=20, t=0.7, TPDC=2. 
 
Proof for Result 12 
Given the innovation sharing level y and investment sharing level x, wholesale price ω and 
innovation level θ, the PDC determines the retail price (p) that maximizes its anticipated profit 
(equation 15) which yields 
 
 
,
2
E a f d b
p
b
 
 
 
    
The TDC forecasts the retail price of PDC as E(p) = (a0+dθ+bω)/(2b), in the absence of the 
forecast data. When this value is substituted into the profit function of the TDC, we obtain the 
optimal innovation level and wholesale price from the PDC’s profit function.  
Substituting these into the profit function of the PDC in equation (15), we get 
     2 2(( ( ) ((1 ) ) (1 ) ) | )NCIPDC PDC TDCE f E p a bp d I y cy T I y c y T f                    (A5) 
From the FOC, we obtain the value of optimal sharing level y and ϰ. 
 
Proof for Result 13 
 The optimal decisions for the information sharing case can be found similarly as in Result 12. 
The only difference that the TDC in this case forecasts the retail price as 
      2E p f E a f d b b    . Substituting this into the profit function for TDC, we can solve 
for the optimal innovation level and wholesale price from the PDC’s profit function A5, and are 
given in table 7. 
Proof for Result 14 
Given the innovation sharing level y and investment sharing level x, wholesale price ω and 
innovation level θ, the PDC determines the retail price (p) that maximizes its anticipated profit 
(equation 15) which yields 
                  
 
,
2
E a f d b
p
b
 
 
 
    
The TDC forecasts the retail price of PDC as E(p) = (a0+dθ+bω)/(2b), in the absence of the 
forecast data. When this value is substituted into the profit function of the TDC, we obtain the 
optimal innovation level and wholesale price from the PDC’s profit function.  
 Substituting these into the profit function of the PDC in equation (15), we get 
     2 2( ( ) ((1 ) ) (1 ) )NCIPDC PDC TDCE f E p a bp d I y cy T I y c y T f                   
   
From the FOC, we obtain the value of optimal sharing level y and x 
 
Proof for Result 15 
 The optimal decisions for the information sharing case can be found similarly as in Result 14. 
The TDC in this case forecasts the retail price as       2E p f E a f d b b    . Substituting 
this into the profit function for TDC, we can solve for the optimal innovation level and wholesale 
price from the PDC’s profit function are given in table 7. 
 
Proof for Result 16 
  This is found using the profit functions derived for the PDC and the TDC for the no information 
sharing and information sharing case and plotted using the values a0=30, d=1, I=2, TTDC=3, 
V=10, c=20, t=0.7, TPDC=2.  
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